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Abstract
Three influencing techniques were used to elicit objective,
or immature, moral judgments from children who were shown to be
subjective, or mature, on a pretest.

The same techniques were

used to elicit subjective moral judgments from objective children.
The techniques were modeling, experimenter approval of the model's
responses, and explanations of her responses by the model.

The

techniques were incorporated into four treaonents which included
modeling alone, modeling plus approval, modeling plus explanations, and modeling plus approval plus explanations.
Ten moral judgment stories of the kind originated by Piaget
were read to l6S elementary school children to determine their
moral orientations.

Each story described a well intentioned or

accidental act which resulted in a great deal of material damage,
contrasted with a selfishly motivated act which resulted in very
little damage.

One hundred boys and girls, aged 6-4 to 10-2, were

selected as subjects.

Half the children were decidedly objective

in their responses to the pretest, and half were decidedly subjective.

The subjects were randomly assigned to one of the four

treatment groups or to a control group.
During the experimental phase of the study the experimenter
read moral judgment stories alternately to an adult female model
and the individual subjects.

The model responded in a fashion

opposite that of the subject's orientation as measured by the
pretest.

In some cases her responses were approved by the exper-

imenter.

In some cases she explained the rationale for her re-

sponses.

Subjects in the control group heard the same stories

-

but were not exposed to a model, experimenter approval, or explanations of any sort.

Three weeks after the experimental phase all

subjects were asked to respond to another set of moral judgment
stories as a postte&t.

Twenty additional subJects who were se-

lected at random from the original population as an additional
control group also responded to the posttest.
The results showed that objective and subjective subjects
were significantly influenced by modeli.ng to adopt the alternate
moral viewpoint.

Objective children were more influenced toward

subjectivity than subjective children were influenced toward objectivity.
alone.

The most effective influencing technique was modeling

At no time did the experimenter's approval increase the

degree to which the subjects were influenced to change.

When the

model explained her responses, objective children adopted the subjective orientation more readily than when she did not. For subjective children, however, the model's explanations did not result
in a greater nwnber of objective responses.

The sex of the sub-

jects was found to be of no consequence in terms of their susceptibility to the influencing techniques.
The results were discussed in terma of their relevance to
Bandura's social learning theory and Piaget's cognitive development theory.

The powerful

modelin~

effect was interpreted as

lending supporc to Bandura's interpretation of moral development.
Piaget's theory was supported by the demonstration that the mod-

el's explanations were effective only in influencing children in
the direction of increasing subjectivity.

Further research was

suggested to clarify the relationship of moral judgment to moral
behavior.
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Chapter I

Introduction
People are confronted each day with the need to
make decisions about the appropriate reactions to situations in which they are involved.

When such decisions

include "judgments about the good and right of action"
(Kohlberg, 1964, p. 405)
involved.

1

the area of moral judgment is

The question of how people come to make the

moral judgments which they do has been a focus of thinkers since Meno asked Socrates how the concept of virtue
is acquired by men.

Theoretical explanations of the na-

ture of 1110ral development have ranged from emphasis on
the emotional attachment between parent and child (Freud,
1930) to the growing ability of the child to use his intellect to assimilate new points of view and to empathize
with them (Piaget, 1965).

Early theorizing about the na-

ture of moral development was accompanied by little empirical research except for the classical studies in 1928
by Hartshorne and May and in 1932 by Piaget (Piaget,
1965).

A resurgence of interest in the area of moral

judgment has been accompanied by considerable research in
the past decade stemming largely from the work of
Kohlberg and his associates (e.g. Kohlberg, 1963. 1964;
- 1 -
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Krebs, 1968; Rest, Turiel, & Kohlberg, 1966).
The present investigation is concerned with one
aspect of the recent revival of interest in moral judgments, specifically the effectiveness of several techniques in influencing children to modify their moral
judgments.

To give perspective to the present investiga-

tion, a review of theoretical and empirical work in the
area of moral development is a necessary precursor.
Psychoanalytic Theor;y

2!

Identification

The psychoanalytic approach to the issue of moral
development is concerned primarily with the affective
interaction between the child and bis parents (Freud,
1930).

The basic vehicle for inculcation of moral

values is considered in psychoanalytic theory to be the
superego, that portion of Freud's tripartite intrapsychic
model which is supposed to reflect parental (and therefore, cultural) values.

Often referred to as a represen-

tation of the conscience, the superego condemns thought
and behavior which transgresses the parental moral code
and threatens punishment for such misbehavior.

Partic-

ularly in the areas of agressive and sexual behavior, the

- 3 -

auperego plays the role of moral overseer.
The superego develops through the process of identification, according to psychoanalytic theory {Watson,
1959).

In normal development, children identify with the

like-sexed parent, adopting that parent's modes of behavior and values.

The Oedipal period is felt

cial in the process of identification.

to

be cru-

In this period,

girls identify with their mothers because of the threat
of a loss of maternal love, which would result from
mother - daughter competition for the father's affection.
Boys identify with their fathers out of fear of potential
castration which would be the result of competition for
the mother.

This period normally includes a child's

fifth and sixth years, and the identification which is
the result of the resolved Oedipal period leads to an

adoption of the parent's value system, providing a basis
for the superego's prohibitions and the ego ideal's positive strivings.
The psychoanalytic theory of identification has been
criticized for its emphasis upon data which cannot be
directly observed but which have to be inferred from doll
play, developmental reconstruction, or dream analysis
(Bandura & Walters, 1963).

The particular mechanisms by

- 4 which the process of identification is supposed to take
place are not clear in Freud's theory.

Sears, Maccoby,

and Levin (1957) suggested that identification takes
place primarily through the child's active practicing of
the roles of adults in his life, particularly his parents.

Through such role practice, theorized Sears

et al., children insure themselves of continued parental
affection because they adopt the parents' values and develop a conscience.

A similar theory has been advanced

by Bandura and McDonald (1963), who have used a social
learning framework for interpreting the tendency for
children to adopt the attitudes and ideas of the same-sex
parent.
Finally, Sears, Rau, and Alpert (1965) have concluded that it is unlikely that a single theoretical
mechanism can account for the process of identification.
They have proposed that the many different manifestations
of mature conscience may develop in different ways.

Piaget's Cognitive Theory

2! Moral

Development

Another way to approach the issue of moral development is to focus primarily on cognitive judgments rather

- 5 -

than the emotional aspects of socialization.

This ap-

proach characterized the research of Margaret Schallenberger (1894), who analyzed the essays written by nearly
3500 California children ranging from six to sixteen

years in age.

The essays were written in response to a

story read to them about a girl who had painted all the
parlor chairs with a new box of paints in order to make
them look pretty.

The children were asked to explain

what they would have done if they were the mother in such
a situation.

Younger children advocated severe punish-

ment, such as whipping, and often cited a vengeful reason
for the punishment.

Older children, on the other hand,

more often mentioned trying to reason with the child and
reserved the use of strong physical punishment as a
teaching device "to make sure she wouldn't do it again. tt
(Schallenberger, 1894, p. 91).

In summarizing the dif-

ferent approaches used by the children, Schallenberger
reported that "young children judge of actions by their
results, older ones look at the motives which prompt
them." (p. 96) •
.

The strongest advocate and most prolific researcher
for the

cogniti~e

Jean Piaget.

approach to moral development has been

Although he bas now abandoned this

F
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particular area of research, his early work (Piaget,
1965) has provided the impetus for many other studies.
There is no evidence that Piaget was acquainted with
Schallenberger's research, but his technique for studying moral judgments was a logical extension of hers and
his findings were also similar to hers.
Piaget's approach to moral development was similar
to Schallenberger's in his emphasis on the judgments
which children make about certain actions.

This is in

contrast to Piaget's contemporary, Freud, who focused on
the emotional aspects of moral development, particularly
as evidenced in the process of identification in the
Oedipal period (Freud, 1930).

Piaget also carried out

empirical research to help form and then test his hypotheses whereas Freud's theory derived primarily from his
clinical experience with neurotic individuals.
The techniques used by Piaget to gather data have
often been criticized (Flavell, 1963), but his research
has stimulated a great many further studies because of
the fascinating things he found out about children in his
relatively relaxed research style.

In his investigations

concerning moral judgment, Piaget and his associates
interviewed Swiss children to learn how they formed

F
- 7 -

judgments.

In the first portion of the book which re-

sulted from these interviews, Piaget reported the various
ways in which children make rules about playing games of

marbles.

He noted an orderly progression with increasing

age through several stages concerning the rules of the
game.

Young children play without any formal rules and

simply try to hit one another's marbles.

As they grow

older, children introduce competition and rules to give
the players about the same chances for winning.

Operating

under a set of rules they at first tend to treat the
rules as unbreakable and inflexible, considering them to
have been laid down by some authority.
grow more tolerant of rule breaking

Older children

~men

they realize

that the rules are simply conveniences and can be altered

if greater player equality or convenience can be achieved.
More pertinent to this investigation, however, are
the other techniques which Piaget used with the Swiss
children.

He and his associates told the children pairs

of stories and asked them to make judgments about the
characters and their actions.

One of the pairs of sto-

ries he used was the following:
A.

A little boy who is called John is in his
room. He is called to dinner. He goes
into the dining room. But behind the door

- 8 -

B.

there was a chair, and on the chair there
was a tray with fifteen cups on it. John
couldn't have known that there was all
this behind the door. He goes in, the
door knocks against the tray, bang go the
fifteen cups and they all get broken!
Once there was a little boy whose name was
Henry. One day when his mother was out he
tried to get some jam out of the cupboard.
He climbed up on to a chair and stretched
out his arm. But the jam was too high up
and he couldn't reach it and have any.
But while he was trying to get it he
knocked over a cup. The cup fell down and
broke.
(Piaget, 1965, p. 122)

Piaget asked the children he interviewed to name the
naughtier of the two boys in the stories and to indicate
how that judgment was made.

He

concluded that children

form such moral judgments on the basis of different con•
siderations at different ages.

For example, young chil-

dren (up to about the age of eight years) reacted to mis•
deeds in the stories by suggesting that the degree of
blame was directly proportional to the degree of damage
caused by the misdeed, regardless of the story character's intent.

This dimension of judgment was called

"moral realism" by Piaget, and he theorized that it is
the constraining attitude of adults which is largely responsible for such an attitude on the part of young
children.

Children with this point of view were said by

Piaget to display "objective" moral judgment.

Older

pc
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children, on the other hand, judged the boy to be naughtier who intended to take some jam when his mother was
absent, even though the resulting damage was relatively
minor by comparison with that caused by the other boy.
This was termed "subjective" moral judgment by Piaget.
The different attitudes of younger and older children
were similar to those described by Schallenberger.
There were other aspects of moral judgment which
Piaget defined through his interviews with children.
example, the younger children (again, up

to

For

about eight

years) believed in ,.immanent justice." That is, they
believed that because justice exists in all animate and
inanimate things a person's misdeed will soon be punished
even if it is never detected by another person.

This was

a popular children's explanation for accidents.

Older

children, however, subscribed to the notion that unfortunate occurrences happen by chance rather than as a consequence of one's previous misdemeanors.

Piaget further

found that young children believed that the most effective punishment is that which is very severe and is oriented toward retribution and expiation, whereas older
children rejected the idea that punishment must be severe
in order to be effective and advocated restitution as a

ps
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fair means of righting a wrong.

Again, the similarity

to Schallenberger's findings is apparent.

Finally,

Piaget discovered that young children were willing to
hold a group responsible for the actions of one member,
while older children felt that each individual was responsible for his own actions.
The particular aspect of moral judgment which has
received the most attention from researchers following
Piaget has been moral realism, possibly because it can
be investigated in a relatively systematic fashion.
Piaget theorized that the objective viewpoint of the
young child, that deeds are to be judged in terms of
their consequences and not by the intentions of the
doers, is a result of the normal daily constraints put
on the child's activities by his parents (Piaget, 1965).
That is, there are many occasions in the life of the

young child in which behavior is prohibited regardless
of the child's intentions, such as playing with electrical apparatuses or handling certain delicate objects.

As the child grows older, however, he begins to interact
with his peers on a regular basis.

Piaget pointed to

this experience as the opportunity for moral judgments
to be formed on the basis of mutual need, much as

pa
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progressive experience with marble games leads to more
democratic and more flexible rules.

The adoption of a

mature, or subjective, method of forming moral judgments
results from the development of the idea of justice from
cooperating with peers.
Consistent with Piaget's general dialectical approach to child development, his theory of moral development emphasizes the role of "social interaction (providing) an impetus for disturbing the present cognitive
organization, leading to a state of disequilibration,
and ultimately resulting in a new level of cognitive
organization CT:owan, Langer, Heavenrich, & Nathanson,
1969; p. 26~ • "

Thus it is apparent that Piaget con-

ceives the development of the child's ability to make
subjective moral judgments to be similar to development
in other areas of logical thinking.

For example, the

young child comes to the notion of conservation of volume
only by being exposed to demonstrations of the principle
which he can understand.

Such exposure forces a re•

evaluation of the child's earlier belief that pouring a
liquid from one container to another container of differ•
ent size or shape brings about a change in the volume of
the liquid (Piaget, 1950; Flavell, 1963).

In a similar

p

- 12 way Piaget argued that increasing cooperation and mutual
respect among children forces a re-evaluation of the
early objective attitude which regards rules as inflexible and focuses exclusively on the material results of
one's misdeeds.
The Relationshie Between Freud's

!!.!'!.!! Piaget's Theories

There have been attempts in recent years to place
both Freud's theory of identification and Piaget's cognitive theory of moral development into historical perspective and to show how they may be construed as complementary rather than competitive.

For example Bobroff

(1960) bas pointed out that both theories emphasize a
progressive growth away from subjectivity (Piaget's
"egocentrism," Freud's "autism") toward a realistic
awareness of the self in relation

to

others.

In each

theory the self is seen as becoming increasingly differentiated, Freud focusing primarily on internal dynamic
development and Piaget stressing the child's relationships with the external world.

Bobroff attempted to

demonstrate a similarity in the developmental sequence of
the understanding of rules of marble games (such as
Piaget described). and the progressive stages of ego

p
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development as revealed in children's Thematic Apperception Test stories.

Bobroff's analysis of the date

yielded by 32 normal and 32 retarded (IQ 60 - 80) boys
indicated that four basic stages could be determined
which were characteristic of the boys at different ages.
The boys appeared to go through a particular stage in ego
maturation, as shown in their TAT stories, at the same
time they were in a comparable atage of socialization, as
shown in their use of rules in games of marbles.

Bobroff

concluded that such a degree of consistency implied that
Piaget's theory of mental growth and the psychoanalytic
theory of ego development are really different kinds of
descriptions of the same thing, namely, the child's de•
veloping ability to relate to other people and empathize
with them.
Bobroff's research suggests that common ground may
be found between the psychoanalytic and the Piagetian
descriptions of the child's moral development.

But cau-

tion is required in interpreting the results of his investigation.

For example, he combined subjects of normal

and defective intelligence into the same experimental
groups.

Although he attempted to equate the subjects for

mental age within each group by including retarded

- 14 -

children who were two chronological years older than the
normal subjects, it is unclear from the data whether be
was successful in creating groups which differed significantly from one another in mental age.

Also questiona-

ble is the procedure by which Bobroff distinguished the
various stages of the rules of the marble games.

All

that can be inferred from his report is that the stages
seemed to differ in terms of rule consistency and complexity and also the nature of the relationships among
the players.

He presented no data to support the asser-

tion that the stages did differ from one another in terms
of objective measurements, such as the number of rules or
frequency of interpersonal interaction.

The stages of

ego development were based on Henry's (1956) scheme for
analyzing Thematic Apperception Test protocols, which is
a systematic procedure based on enumeration of various
story themas or content items.

The above criticism of

Bobroff 's research is not intended to downgrade his at·
tempt to point out similarities between two different

theories of moral development.

It is quite possible that

Freud and Piaget were describing different aspects of the
same thing when they described identification and moral
judgment, but Bobroff's research is not convincing in

-

- 15 this regard.
Another attempt to draw a parallel between the
psychoanalytic approach and Piaget's theories is an
article by Nass (1966).

He compared the morality of

constraint (objective morality) in Piaget's theory to
the developmental stage described by Freud in which the
immature ego is unable to test reality (Nass, 1966).

In

a neo-Freudian exposition of ego development, Nass compared the ego's capacity to cope with internal drives
and the irrational superego as well as the pressures of
the outside world to Piaget's description of the development of subjective moral judgments which are based on
mutual respect and cooperation.

From Nass' point of

view, psychoanalytic theory can form a broad theoretical
background for interpreting the more specific observations of Piaget.

While it may be true that similarities

in approach and interpretation may be seen in the two
theories, it does not seem logical to subsume one under
the other, particularly when psychoanalytic theory is
built primarily on what Nass described as "introspective
reports, developmental reconstructions, and theoretical
inferences [p. 6ij • "

Nevertheless it is important to

realize that both theories attempt to explain the process

p
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which children become socialized in Western culture,

and that it is possible that each may contribute heavily
to some future integrated theory of socialization.

I!!!. Piagetian Approach !9. Recent Years
Piaget's work on moral judgment did not initially
stimulate much further research, either by himself or by
others.

In a recent interview (Hall, 1970) Piaget in-

dicated that he became interested in other problems of
child development and consequently neglected the area of
moral judgment.

He did direct a bit of research in

Geneva by Lerner (1937), who found that the progression
from objective to subjective morality is accompanied by
an increase in empathic skill, the ability to anticipate
the likely interests and reactions of another person in a
social situation.

But his book on moral judgment re-

mained untranslated into English until 1948, and American
child psychologists were more interested in bis work on
children's intellectual growth and their use of logic and
reasoning.
In the past decade, Lawrence Kohlberg bas used the
Piagetian theory and technique as the basis for developing an expanded theory of moral development.

In a review

....
- 17 of Piaget's theory, Kohlberg (1964) has presented data
which support some of Piaget's ideas of moral development
and fail to support others.

His research technique con-

sisted primarily of asking children to make judgments
about moral dilemmas, presented to them in story form.
Some were derived directly from Piaget, while other s tories were devised by Kohlberg to detect certain kinds of
thinking.

Like Piaget, Kohlberg found that young chil-

dren judge an act by its consequences, whereas older
children judge it according to the intentions of the
actor.

Furthermore, young children judge deeds as to-

tally right or wrong, unlike older children who acknowl•
edge the possibility of degrees of guilt and who recognize that others may hold different opinions about the
same deed.

Also, young children often judge an act to

be bad becaus• it elicits punishment, but older children

use the criteria of rule violation or injury to others in
order to judge an act.

Piaget's observations of the

young child's belief in "immanent justice,. and the efficacy of harsh punishment were also confirmed by Kohll>erg.
Piaget (1965) proposed still other characteristics
of moral development which were not supported by Kohlberg' s research.

For example, Kohlberg found no evidence

...
- 18 that increasine; maturity in moral judgment was accompanied by greater cooperation with and respect for peers.
Nor did he fine that older children preferred to be held
responsible for acts individually rather than collectively.

Kohlberg found that older children were not

generally willing to delegate to authority the right to
punish; instead they advocated direct retaliation by
victims as means of settling grievances.

Kohlberg point-

ed out that his and Piaget's investigations were carried
out at much different times and in different cultures,
and that the observations by Piaget which he failed to
confirm were related primarily to social factors.

Those

observations which were confirmed were of differences
between younger and older children in cognitive skills.
As a result of his own and his colleagues' research
(e.g., Rest, Turiel, & Kohlberg, 1969; Turiel, 1966),
Kohlberg has formulated

B

scheme of moral development

which progresses through three levels, each level having
two stages.

This scheme directly reflects Piaget's

theory in several respects.

Both Kohlberg and Piaget

feel that there is an invariant developmental sequence
from im..11ature (objective) moral reasoning to mature
(subjective) moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1964; Piaget,

- 19 1965).

That is, .:Joral developcrlent is seen as progressing

from one stage to another without the possibility of
omitting any stage because each is a necessary foundation
for the next.

In addition, Kohlberg (1964) agrees with

Piaget that it is altogether possible for a child to make
mature judgments in one area of moral development (e.g.,
Uloral realism) while continuing for a time to make inuna-

ture judgments in another area (e.g., immanent justice).
Both writers also agree on the irreversibility of the

process of moral development.

That is, once a child has

attained a subjective moral attitude (or has progressed
from one level to another), he will not revert back to an
earlier, less rnature, point of view in making moral judgments (Rest, 1967).
Kohlberg's stages of
a~plification

dichotomy.

~oral

development represent an

of Piaget's original objective-subjective

With his defined stages and rnoral judgment

stories it is possible to determine the degree of moral
development of persons of all ages and in many different
cultures (Kohlberg, 1968).

He has found that children in

Mexico, Taiwan, France, and the United States all pro•
gress through the same stages of moral thought, and he
has concluded that "the nature of (the) sequence is not
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affected by widely varying social, cultural, or religious
conditions.

The only thing that is affected is the

~

at which individuals progress through this sequence
[jcohlberg, 1968, p. 30] • "

Kohlberg's scheme of moral

development bas even been applied to the writings of
statesmen and the thoughts of campus radicals.
Like Piaget, Kohlberg ascribes growth in moral rea•
soning to the increasing influence of the peer group.
But he also believes that parents and society at large
continue to exert an influence as the child matures.

In

fact, Kohlberg feels that children learn the same basic
moral principles from all chief sources of influence.
"Instead of participation in various groups causing conflicting developmental trends in morality, it appears
that participation in various groups converges in stimulating the development of basic moral virtues, which are
not transmitted by one particular group as opposed to
another lj(ohlberg, 1964, pp. 406-407] ." The peer group
is particularly important for the development of mature
moral judgments because of the increasing amount of time
spent with peers as children grow older.

The influence

of peers on children's decisions has been shown by Utech
and Hoving (1969) to increase relative t:> parental
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influence as children grow older.

lb!. Social-learning Theory Approach .!:,2. Moral Development
Recent theoretical and empirical attempts to understand how children come to make certain kinds of moral
judgments have been made from a learning theory point of
view.

This approach conceives of moral development as a

process of learning responses to particular situations in
order to obtain a positive reinforcement or to avoid a
negative reinforcement.

Eysenck (1960) has defined moral

judgment in the context of a learning theory model.
According to him, conscience is
a conditioned response built up during the
child's formative years by the pairing of
conditioned stimuli {arising from aggressive,
predatory, and OYertly sexual actions) and
unconditioned stimuli (slaps, beatings,
'shaming', and other punishment) immediatel)
following the conditioned stimuli. Aided by
a process of stimulus generalization, this
should, in the course of time, lead to an
association between the conditioned stimulus
and the fear-anxiety responses appropriate
to the unconditioned stimulus.
(Eysenck, 1960, p. 11)
The learning theory approach rejects the emphasis upon
internal dynamic tensions which are crucial
choanalytic concept of identification.

to

the psy-

The process of

identification is seen as the imitation of adult figures
who have the power to dispense rewards.
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Aronfreed (1968) has proposed that there are two
basic mechanisms by which humans are socialized.

The

first is the use of a reward or punishment immediately
following an act in order to increase or decrease the
probability of its reoccurrence.

This is the technique

to which Eysenck was referring in his definition of
conscience.

A second mechanism is the learning of appro•

priate actions through the observation of other people,
particularly if the outcome of their behavior is appar•
ent.

This second procedure involves the imitation of

social models, which involves the ability to cognitively
represent to oneself the behavior of someone else and to
then reproduce it.

Aronfreed argued that imitation as a

socialization mechanism only becomes effective when the
child attains some empathic ability, since it is necessary
for the child to appreciate the possibility of obtaining
a reward or punishment for himself if he engages in the
same activity as the model.
The basis for Aronfreed's second socialization mechanism is the large body of research which has appeared in
recent years which reveals that the behavior of a model
can influence behavior in observers.

For example, exper•

irnental subjects have imitated models• aggressive
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behaviors (Bandura, Ross, & Ross, 1961), standards for
self-reward or punishment (Bandura & Kupers, 1963), and
euphoric behavior (Schachter & Singer, 1962).
There is one study of the influence of models upon
the behavior of observers which is directly relevant to
the topic of this paper.

This is the investigation re•

ported by Bandura and McDonald (1963), in which children
who were exposed to models who advocated a particular

moral orientation adopted that orientation for themselves.
Bandura and McDonald classified boys and girls as objective or subjective in their moral attitudes by means of a

pretest based on Piaget's story items.

Some items were

taken directly from Piaget's book and others were devised
by

the investigators along the same lines as the original

items.

Forty-eight children who advocated the subjective

moral orientation and 36 others who were objective were
identified by the 12-item pretest.

Each child was then

individually exposed to an adult female model who responded to another set of stories based on Piaget's
items.

The model was instructed to respond in a manner

contrary to the child's moral orientation as determined
in the pretest.

Thus if a child had given subjective

responses on the pretest, the model gave objective
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responses.

The experimenter alternately read stories to

the model and the child, each answering in the presence
of the other.

Immediately following this phase, in which

they had been exposed to the model, the children were
taken by a different experimenter to a different room and
were asked to respond to still another set of moral judg•
ment stories without any model being present.

Bandura

and McDonald found that there was a significant tendency
for the children to abandon their initial moral orientations, as measured by the pretest, and to adopt the orientation advocated by the model.

This newly adopted

orientation was maintained during the posttest in the
absence of the model.
The experiment by Bandura and McDonald is significant for several reasons.

First, they used the same

criteria as Piaget for measuring moral orientation and
then demonstrated that the children's judgments could be
altered simply by exposing them to a model who advocated
a different point of view.

According to Piaget, such a

reorientation as seemed to take place in Bandura and
McDonald's study should have taken place only after increasing peer cooperation and respect, resulting in a
complete readjustment of cognitive structures.

Another
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significant aspect of the Bandura and McDonald study is
that they found that it made no difference if the subject

was verbally reinforced by the experimenter for changing
his moral orientation.

Subjects who were not reinforced

altered their responses as much as those who were reinforced, as long as they were exposed to a model who was
reinforced by the experimenter for answering as she did.
In fact, subjects who were reinforced for changing their
moral attitudes but who were not exposed to any model
did not significantly alter their responses.

Thus it

would seem that the powerful influencing factor was the
model exposure, not the rewards received by the subjects.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Bandura
and McDonald study is the fact that both objective and
subjective children were influenced to approximately the
same degree to alter their responses in the direction
advocated by the model.

As it has already been pointed

out, Piaget and Kohlberg have stated that it is not to
be expected that children will regress in their moral
orientations, and that theoretically they should only be
able to be influenced to go from an objective to a subjective view.

The demonstration by Bandura and McDonald

that subjective children can be influenced toward
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doubt.
The Bandura and McDonald study has been criticized
recently on theoretical as well as methodological grounds
by Cowan et al. (1969).

For example, they pointed out

that Piaget's "stage" theory of moral development allows
for a great deal of flexibility in terms of the age at
which a child may abandon the objective attitude and
adopt the subjective point of view.

They noted that

Bandura and McDonald (1963) had interpreted Piaget's
theory in a rigid fashion, saying that there are two
clear-cut stages of moral judgment, demarcated from each
other at about age seven.

Furthermore, Cowan et al.

argued that Piaget has made it clear that social interaction is crucial to the adoption of a subjective moral
attitude, and that Bandura and McDonald were wrong in
implying that Piaget conceived ot moral development as
the natural unfolding of innate propensities.
One of the methodological criticisms of the Bandura
and McDonald study made by Cowan et al. was that children
had been used as subjects who were apparently in a transitional period, averaging about 20 per cent of their
pretest responses in the to-be•conditioned direction.

- 27 In their own modification of the experiment, Cowan et al.
included children judged to be definitely objective or
subjective as well as some who were transitional.

They

also criticized the fact that the posttest came immediately after the modeling phase in the Bandura and
McDonald experiment, and in their own modification included an immediate posttest for some subjects and a
posttest after a period of two weeks for other subjects.
Cowan et al. also objected to the fact that Bandura and
McDonald had considered only the children's responses
which named the ''naughtier" story character without considering the children's explanations for their responses.
Cowan et al. considered both types of responses in their
experiment.
In spite of all the criticisms they leveled at the
Bandura and McDonald study, Cowan et al. found nearly
the same results when they replicated the experiment
with their own modifications.

Reflecting on the results

of the Cowan et al. investigation, Bandura (l969b)
commented,
Consistent with the results of the previous
experiment, the authors found that modeling
emerges as a significant determinent of moral
judgments regardless of the direction in which
judgmental behavior is being modified, the
time at which the post exposure tests are
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administered, and whether the analysis
is made in terms of the children's
judgments or the reasons they give for
their dee is ions •
(p. 275)

The fact that models can indeed influence children
to alter their moral

judg.~ents

appears to have been

established by the Bandura and McDonald and the Cowan
et al. studies.

The larger question of just bow chil-

dren's moral judgments are influenced by models is not
answered by those investigations, however.

An attempt

to isolate some of the critical factors in model influence has been made by Dworkin (1968).

He pointed out

that although the Bandura and McDonald experiment demonstrated the effectiveness of models as a means of
altering children's moral judgments, it is impossible to
determine from that experiment just what factors may
have been important or crucial in influencing the children's judgments.

Dworkin showed that in the modeling

phase of the Bandura and McDonald study the model answered in a manner contrary to the subject's pretest
orientation and included in her answer not only the name
of the naughtier person (identification) but also an ex•
planation (cognitive information) about why she considered that person

to

be naughtier than tbe other.

addition, the model was verbally reinforced by the

In
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experimenter each time she responded.

Dworkin reasoned

that the children in the Bandura and McDonald study could
have learned the concept of intentionality in several
ways.

First, they may have simply imitated the model and

always responded with the name of the person who intended
mischief.

Second, they could have used the cognitive ex-

planation, or rationale, which the model gave for identifying the naughtier person.

Finally, the children may

have reacted to the reinforcement which the model always
received when she responded, and may have thereby re•
sponded ln a manner similar to the model's.

Dworkin

attempted to separate these possible methods of learning
the concept of intentionality.

He also included an im-

portant control condition which neither Bandura and
McDonald nor the Cowan et al. studies had included.
The experimental design used by Dworkin was based
on the model of the Bandura and McDonald experiment.

It

involved a pretest to establish the children's base rates
of responding, an experimental phase in which the children were individually exposed to an adult female model,
and finally a posttest after a period of three weeks.
the experimental phase,

sotue

In

children were exposed to a

model who merely specified the name of the story character
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whom she considered naughtier.

In some cases the model

was reinforced by the experimenter for her response.
Some children saw a model who not only named the naughtier story character but also justified her answer by
appealing to the concept of intentionality.

All the sub-

jects were girls, and all were influenced in the direction of intentionality (subjectivity).

The control con-

dition included children who were pretested, then read
stories by the experimenter with es?. model present, and
finally posttested.
As in the studies cited earlier, Dworkin found that
his subjects shifted their moral judgments to a significant degree in the direction advocated by the model.

The

most effective technique was that which included cognitive information, as shown by the fact that subjects in
this condition altered their judgments to a greater degree than did the subjects in the other conditions.

For

all bis subjects, the relative amount of shift in moral
orientation was maintained over a period of three weeks
until the postteat was administered.

Dworkin concluded

that the most effective moral training technique would
be one which focused on cognitive processes, communicating to the child the relevant cognitive dimensions of the

- 31 moral concept being taught.
Major Issues

!n £!!!. !.£!.!, 2! Moral Judgment Today

There are several unresolved issues to which the present experiment has been directed.

Foremost among these is

the process by which children acquired a mature, or subjective, moral point of view.

The theoretical and empiri-

cal works of Freud and Piaget on this point have been
briefly reviewed, as well as the learning theory point of
view, particularly as advocated by Bandura.

Freud's theo-

ry of identification is based primarily on inferences
gained from clinical work with neurotic individuals in
which introspective reports, dream analysis, and developmental reconstructions constitute the major source of data.
Such a theory does not easily lend itself to experimental
verification.
Piaget's theory is more readily translated into exper•
imental manipulation since it is derived primarily from empirical observations and tests.

The modeling technique de-

scribed by Bandura and McDonald (1963) appears to be a good
procedure by which to test some of Piaget's notions.

this

has already been done, with Bandura and McDonald and Cowan
et al. demonstrating how models can be used

to

alter the
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These

latter two investigations have also demonstrated that it is
possible to influence children from a subjective to an obJective attitude, something which does not seem to fit in
with Piaget's theory.

Finally, Dworkin (1968) has de-

scribed some factors in the modeling situation which appear
efficacious in influencing children's moral judgments.
The issue of the process by which models influence the
moral judgments of children bas not been completely resolved by Dworkin's work.

For example, Dworkin analyzed

the effects of modeling alone, modeling plus reinforcement,
and modeling plus cognitive information.

The present ex-

periment analyzed those effects as well as the effect of
cognitive information combined with modeling and reinforcement.

Furthermore, the cumulative effects of exposure

to Piaget-type moral judgment stories have not been stud•
iad.

Thus the present investigation included a control

group which received only a posttest without prior exposure
to the pretest or modeling.

The investigation by Bandura and McDonald (1963) has
been the only one in which the effects of the children's
sex has been systematically studied concerning their
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susceptibility to models who advocate different moral
viewpoints.

Their study revealed no differences between

the moral judgment responses of boys and girls before or
after they were exposed to the models.

The study by Cowan

et al. (1969) included both boys and girls, but their responses were not analyzed separately by sex.

Dworkin's

(1968) study involved only girls.
Although sex was not an important variable in the
Bandura and McDonald (1963) experiment, other studies indicate that sex should continue to be investigated in the
context of children's moral judgments.

For example,

Bandura, Ross, and Ross (1961) have reported that boys imitate the aggressive acts of a model to a significantly
greater extent than girls.

Likewise Sears et al. (1957)

reported that in their daily activities and doll play boys
consistently displayed more overt aggression than girls.
The most aggressive boys were those whose fathers provided
aggressive models.

Since aggression is often linked with

moral issues in our society and either directly or indi•
rectly is the topic of many of Piaget's moral judgment
stories, it is reasonable to believe that differences may
be found between boys and girls in terms of their suseeptibility to a model who advocates an
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Sex does not appear to be a significant variable when
knowledge of basic moral virtues or resistance to temptation is considered.

Hartshorne and May (1928) found that

boys and girls were equally familiar with moral rules and
also equally susceptible to neglecting these principles
when given the opportunity to do so without being caught.
Krebs (1968) has reported similar findings.

According to

Kohlberg's (1963) six-stage model of moral maturity, the
girls and boys in Krebs 1 study scored at the same level.
And girls and boys succumbed equally often to the temptation of cheating at a game in order to win prizes.

In

spite of these findings, Krebs reported that teachers consistently rated girls as more moral than boys.
The present investigation included both boys and
girls and analyzed their responses separately in an attempt to replicate Bandura and McDonald's {1963) study.
Finally, the question of reversibility of moral at•
titude should be focused upon.

Piaget, Kohlberg, and

Kohlberg's associates {Rest, 1968; Reat, Turiel, &
Kohlberg, 1969) have argued that moral development is
essentially an irreversible process.

That is, develop-

ment can proceed in the direction of greater maturity,
but children cannot really be influenced to adopt a less
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mature point of view.

The work of Turiel (1966), often

cited, demonstrated that children prefer moral judgments
one or two levels above their own level (in the Kohlberg
scheme) rather than judgments which are one level below
their present level.

In contrast to this are the inves•

tigations by Bandura and McDonald (1963) and Cowan et al.
{1969), which did demonstrate that children can be influenced toward objective moral reasoning even though they
previously used subjective moral reasoning.

Furthermore,

LeFurgy and Woloshin {1968) showed that children can be
influenced toward objective moral judgments by means of
peer influence.

These inveetigators used tape recorded

responses by the subjects• peers (acting as the experimenter's confederates) to influence the subjects to adopt
a different moral point of view.

Turiel (1969) has ar•

gued that the children in such experiments do not actually
adopt the model's mode of thinking, but that they simply
acquiesce in order to obtain social reinforcement.

For

this reason the present investigation included several
different techniques to influence children to respond in a
manner contrary to their original orientations.

These

techniques employed logical explanations and social reinforcement singly and in cornbiua tion so tba t the relative
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importance of each could be demonstrated.
Although it would appear to have been established
that subjective children can be influenced to adopt objective moral reasoning, the question remains as to whether
such influence is as effective in the first place or as
long-lasting as when objective children are influenced
toward subjective moral reasoning.

This is an important

point, for Bandura's (1969) theoretical position is that
it should be equally possible to influence children in either direction.

Cowan et al. (1969) have claimed that

their data showed that objective children were influenced
more toward subjectivity than subjective children were
influenced toward objectivity.

Bandura (1969) has pointed

out, however, that this contention is not supported by
quantitative analysis of the data, but only by visual inspection of one of their printed figures.

A similar com-

ment can be made concerning the figures of LeFurgy and
Woloshin (1968). which appear to show that children are
more readily influenced in the "natural" direction (toward
subjectivity).

This observation has not been supported by

statistical analysis, however.

Thus it remains an open

question as to whether children can be as readily influenced to adopt an objective moral orientation as they
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For

this reason the present investigation included an attempt
to influence objective children toward subjectivity and
vice versa, in hopes of contributing to a resolution of
the theoretical difference between Piaget's stage theory
and Bandura's social learning theory.
The Present Investigation
The experiment reported here has relied heavily on
the research of Bandura and McDonald (1963) and Dworkin

(1968).

The first purpose of the experiment has been to

demonstrate the fact that it is possible to use models to
influence children to make certain kinds of moral judgments.

The other

pur~ose

has been to experimentally test

the following hypotheses:
1.

The influencing techniques used in the present

experiment differ in the degree to which they bring
about changes in children's moral judgments.

In

order of decreasing effectiveness the techniques are
modeling plus reinforcement plus cognitive information, i:nodeling plus cognitive information, modeling
plus reinforcement, and modeling alone.
2.

Objective children are more influenced to alter
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their moral judglllents than subjective children.
3.
to

Children differ in susceptibility to influences
change their moral judgments according to their

sex.

Chapter II
Method
Subjects
A total of 168 children from two Lutheran elementary
schools in Chicago were pretested with a set of 10 moral
judgment stories.

Fifty boys, aged 6-4 to 9•11, and 50

girls, aged 6-6 to 10-2 were selected as subjects on the
basis of their pretest scores.

Half the boys and half the

girls were decidedly "objective" in their moral orientations, having responded in a subjective fashion on the
pretest a mean number of only l.76 times.

The remaining

children were decidedly "subjective", having responded in
a subjective fashion on the pretest a mean number of 8.52

times.
An additional 20 subjects were chosen at random from
the classrooms which served as a source for the original
sample of 168 subjects.

These 10 boys and 10 girls formed

one of the control groups, and were exposed only to the
posttest.

The boys ranged in age from 6-5 to 9-7, the

girls from 6-6 to 9-8.
The author of this study served as the experimenter.
The models were two female undergraduate students from
Northwestern University.
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Stimulus Materials
The moral judgment stories were obtained from the
1
work of Dworkin (1968).
Following his procedure, the
subjects were individually presented with pairs of stories, each of which described a well intentioned or accidental act which resulted in a great deal of material
damage, contrasted with a selfishly motivated act which
resulted in very little damage.

The subjects were given

the following instructions:
I have some stories to read to you.

I am
interested in knowing what you think about
them. Each story will tell about two different children and the things they do. I
want you to listen very carefully because
after each story I will ask you some questions. Here is the first story.

The first story in Appendix A was then read by the
experimenter.

At the end of the story, the subject was

asked, "Who do you think did the naughtier thing, Oscar
the first boy, or Bill the second boy?"

After the sub-

ject's response he was asked ''Why do you think
naughtier than

was

?"

During the experimental treatment phase. the same
instructions and questions were read to the model, who

1

Appreciation is expressed to Dr. Earl Dworkin, who
granted permission for the use of the moral judgment
stories.
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The experLuenter read the first story to the model, the
second to the subject, and so forth.

The stories used in

the experimental phase for the subjects are found in Appendix B, and in Appendix C for the models.

The stories

used for the posttest are in Appendix D.
Design
The experimental design for the present study is summarized in Table 1.

The basic design of Dworkin's (1968)

study was followed, which was in turn based largely on the
work of Bandura and McDonald (1963).
The present investigation included children as subjects whose initial moral orientations were either objective or subjective.

Several different procedures were

used to influence objective children to give subjective
responses and to elicit objective responses from subjective children.

In the first procedure, Treatment l, the

model responded to all the moral judgment stories by simply naming the person in the story whom she considered to
be naughtier.

The experimenter verbally approved the mod-

el's responses by saying "Good" or "A fine answer" after
each response.

In treatment 2, the model also responded

with the names of the naughty story characters, but her

TABLE 1

Summary of the Experimental Design
E xperimenta 1
Group

Phase I: Pretest
to establish the
baseline moral
judgments of the
subjects (objective or subjective).

Group A:
Pretest for all
Objective
subjects.
boys (N•25)

Phase II: Experimental
phase. Subjects are
exposed to a model who

advocates the opposite
moral orientation.

Phase III: Posttest
after three weeks.
Subjects respond to
stories as in pretest, but with no
model present.

Posttest for all
Treatment 1. Model
gives names of
subjects.
naughty story characters. Experimenter
approves. (N•5)
Treatment 2.

Model

gives names. Experimenter is neutral.

(N•S)
Treatment 3.

Model

gives names elua
explanatlOns.
Experimenter approves.

(N•5)

Treatment 4. Model
gives names plus
explana tlons.
Experlillenter is
neutral.

(N•5)

Treatment 5. Control
group. Neutral
experimenter reads
stories. No model.

(N•5)

~

N

TABLE l (Continued)
Experimental
Group

Phase I: Pretest.

Group B:
Subjective
boys (N•25)

Pretest for all
subjects.

Phase II: Experimental

Phase III: Posttest.

phase.

Treatment 1. As in Group A.

2.

Post test for
all subjects.

3.

4.
5.

Group C:
Pretest for-all
Objective
subjects.
girls (N•25)

Treatment 1. As in Group A-.-t>Osfte_s_t_xor
2.
all subjects.

Group D:
Pretest for all
Subjective
subjects.
girls (Na25)

Treatment 1. As in Group A.

Posttest for
all subjects.

Group E:
No pretest for
10 boys, 10 any subjects.
girls selected at
random from
population
sources of
Groups A,B,C,
and o.

No treatments for any
subjects.

Posttest for
all subjects.

3.
4.
5.

2.
3.
4.
5.

~

w
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Treatment

3 included explanations by the model as to why she named a
particular person as naughtier.

When the model attempted

to influence children toward subjectivity her explanations
focused on the intentions of the story characters.

She

stressed the relative amounts of physical damage when children were influenced toward objectivity.

The model's re-

sponses in Treatment 3 were verbally approved by the experimenter.

Treatment 4 was identical to Treatment 3 ex-

cept the experimenter's approval was omitted.
Treatment S was a control condition in which the experimenter asked subjects to respond to moral judgment stories in the absence of any model.

An additional control

group is listed in Table 1 as Group E.

Subjects in this

group were exposed only to the posttest, and were not pretested or influenced by models.
The design of the present investigation made possible
the separate analyses of the moral judgment responses of
boys and girls.
according

to

Thus the subjects' responses were analyzed

the subjects' sex, initial moral orientations,

and treatments.
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Procedure
After obtaining the permission of the school administrators and teachers directly involved with the study, the
experimenter visited each of the classrooms which furnished
subjects for the study.
by

He was introduced to the children

the teacher as a man who was interested in learning what

children thought of some stories.

The experimenter ex-

plained that he would ask some of the children to come with
him to listen to the stories, and that some would be asked
to listen more than one time.

He emphasized that the pro-

cedure by which be chose children was governed by chance
and that children could not expect to be chosen on the
basis of grades, appearance, or special pleading.
Phase I:

Pretest to establish baseline moral judg-

ments of the subjects.

In this phase the experimenter read

the 10 pairs of pretest stories to children individually to
determine their base rates of responding.

In order to ob-

tain a sample of 50 objective and 50 subjective children,
168 children were pretested.

The children were chosen at

random from a master list of the first four grades at each
school and were seen privately by the experimenter.

Sub-

jects were classified as objective if they responded to the
stories in a mature fashion O, l, 2, or 3 times.

Subjects
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who responded maturely 7, 8, 9, or 10 times were classified
as subjective.

Those children who were transitional, re-

sponding maturely 4, 5, or 6 times, were not used as subjects for the remaining phases of the experiment.

When 25

subjects for each of the major groups listed in Table 1 had

been selected, they were randomly assigned to the five
treatments, with the provision that each treatment included
five subjects.
Each child was cautioned at the conclusion of the pretest phase not to discuss any of the stories with class•
mates or siblings.

The teachers were also asked to dis-

courage any such discussion, and they reported that the
children were very good about "keeping the stories a surprise for the others."
Phase ll:

Experimental treatment.

Approximately ten

days intervened between the pretest and this phase of the
experiment.

The subjects were again seen individually by

the experimenter in the same room that was used for pretesting.

The experimenter explained to each subject that

he had still another set of stories to read to him.

He

also explained the presence of the female model by saying
that he was interested in learning the reactions of grown•
ups to

these kinds of stories, and that he bad asked her
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to come to the school to listen with the children in order
to aave time.

The experimenter read the instructions to

the model and pointed out to the subject that the procedure
was the same as in the pretest.

The first story was then

xead to the model, the second to the subject, and so forth.
The model was instructed by the experimenter to respond to the stories in a fashion contrary to the subject's
pretest orientation.

Thus if the subject responded objec-

tively on the pretest, the model responded subjectively.

If the experimental condition required, the model explained
her choice of the naughtier story character, and the experimenter approved her response.

If the model's responses

were approved, so were the subject's whenever they agreed
with the model's moral orientation.
Twenty subjects were not exposed to a model during the
experimental phase.

These subjects comprised a control

group which heard the same stories as the other subjects,
but which was not exposed to a model.

At the conclusion

of this phase, all subjects were cautioned not to discuss
any of the details with their classmates or siblings.

Phase IIJ:

Posttest.

After a period of time averag-

ing 20 days since the experimental phase each subject was
exposed to a final set of ten moral judgment stories.

The

- 48 subjects were told that the experimenter wanted to learn
thei,.: ideas about some new stories which were similar to
those they had heard before.

At the completion of this

phase, each subject was thanked for his cooperation and was
urged not

to

discuss the stories with his classmates or

siblings.
Twenty subjects who had been selected at random from
the classrooms which supplied the original 168 subjects for
the pretest were exposed

to

the posttest stories.

These

subjects had not heard the pretest or experimental stories,
and it was determined through questioning that they had not
been previously briefed by other subjects.

These 20 sub-

jects formed the second control group.
After all the subjects had gone through the final
phase of the experiment the experimenter again visited each
of the classrooms to thank the children and to debrief
them.

It was felt that a debriefing was necessary in order

to eliminate any confusion the subjective children may have
felt after being exposed to a model who advocated the objective, or immature point of view.

The experimenter read

three of the moral judgment stories to each class and explained why he felt that the subjective orientation was

correct.

He also explained that the model bad advocated a
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different position from their own in order to see if the
children would adopt her viewpoint.

Nearly all the chil·

dren said they were sure that they had not been influenced
by the model's responses, and they did not appear to have
been confused by the experience.

The debriefing procedure

had the additional benefit of including those children who
had felt left out because they had not been chosen as subjects or because they had heard stories only one time.

Chapter III
Results
Results Pertaining

~

Sh! El§P!rimental Subjects

The data resulting from tbe 80 experimental subjects

were subjected to a repeated measures analysis of variance.
Among the variables examined in this analysis were the
initial moral orientations of the subjects (two levels of
maturity• objective and subjective), the four experimental
treatments, the sex of the subjects, and the three phases

of the experiment.

For all subjects, the unit of measure

was the number of subjective moral judgments made during
each phase of the experiment.

This analysis is summarized

in Table 2.
Of the many variables examined, only two proved to be
significant sources of variance.

([•43.68; ,!!!•l,64;
E. < .005) \Fariables.

e.< .001)

These were the Maturity

and Phases (!•6.76; .!!!•2,128;

Also significant was the interaction

between them (f.•51.27; 2!•2,128; e.<.001). The significant

Maturity variable reflects the fact that the subjects in
the present study were selected on the basis of their
scores in the pretest phase as either

objecti~e

(immature)

or subjective (mature) in tneir moral orientations.
the two groups were decidedly different in terms of
- 50 -

Thus

- 51 Table 2
Analysis of variance of Subjective Moral Judgment
Responses by all Experimental Subjects

Source

-df

Total

239

Between Subjects

-

MS

-F

79

Objective/Subjective
Orientation (Maturity)

l

507.51

Sex

l

14.51

1.25

Treatments

3

1.02

0.09

Maturity x Sex

1

12.61

1.09

Maturity x Treatments

3

22.66

l.95

Treatments x Sex

3

20.90

1.80

Treatments x Sex x Maturity

3

9.71

0.84

64

11.62

Error Between

****

I?.<. 001

43.68****
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Table 2 (Continued)
Source
Within Subjects

-

df

~

-F

160

Phases of Experiment

2

31.91

Phases x Maturity

2

242.01

Phases x Sex

2

8.64

1.83

Phases x Treatments

6

3.70

0.78

Phases x Sex x Maturity

2

3.57

0.76

Phases x Treatments x Maturity

6

8.53

1.81

Phases x Tr ea tmen ts x Sex

6

4.06

0.86

Phases x Treatments x Sex x
Maturity

6

7.30

1.55

128

4. 72

Error Within

***

e. <.005

**** 2<.001

6. 76***

51.27****
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maturity of moral judgments.

Figure l illustrates the

fact that the 40 objective subjects began the experiment
with a mean nwnber of l.76 subjective moral judgments on
the pretest, whereas the 40 subjective subjects began with
a mean number of 8.52 subjective judgments.

Figure 1 also

indicates that a difference between the objective and subjective groups continued to exist throughout the three
phases of the experiment, although interaction over the
phases is apparent.
After the two groups of subjects were purposely selected to be of greatly different moral orientationa, efforts were made to influence the objective children to
make subjective judgments and to influence the subjective
children to make objective judgments.

The significant

interaction between Maturity and Phases reported in Table
2 is thus an artifact of the preselection and experimental
procedures.
Table 2 indicates that Phases alone proved to be a
significant variable in the present experiment.

Figure 2

reveals that when the data from all the experimental subjects are considered together, there was a significant
trend toward increasing subjectivity over the three phases
of the experiment.

It should be remembered that the
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objective and subjective groups of subjects were equal in
number and received the same kinds of influences toward
the opposite sorts of lllOral judgments.

Thus it can be

concluded that the subjects of an objective orientation
were more influenced toward subjectivity than subjective
subjects were influenced toward objectivity.

The second

hypothesis was thereby supported.
The analysis summarized in Table 2 revealed that the
subjects' sex did not affect the degree to which they were
influenced to change their moral judgments.

The third

hypothesis, that children would differ in susceptibility
to influence according to their sex, was not supported.

.£!!!. Effects 2! £!!.!. Treatments
£!l!. Objective !.!!!! Subjective Groups 2! Subjects
Results Pertaining £2.

Y22,!!

The first hypothesis of the present study was that the
effects of the several treatments would be different, as
reflected in the relative amounts of change of the subjects' moral judgments.

Further analysis was required to

adequately test this hypothesis, since the analysis summarized in Table 2 included subjects who were influenced to·
ward greater subjectivity as well aa subjects who were influenced toward greater objectivity.

By including both

groups of subjects, who were influenced in opposite direc-

- 57 tions, the possible different effects of the treatments
were obscured.
Because the analysis summarized in Table 2 indicated
that the sex of the subjects was not a significant variable
in the present study, and because separate analyses for
objective and subjective subjects were necessary in order
to determine the effects of Treatments, the data for the
sexes were combined and then analyzed separately according
to the subjects' moral orientations on the pretest.

These

data are summarized in Table 3.
The four experimental treatments differed from one
another in terms of the inclusion or exclusion of the model' a explanations for her response& and also the inclusion
or exclusion of the experimenter's verbal approval of the
model's responses.

Thus Treatment l involved no explana-

tions by the model, plus the experimenter's approval.
Treatment 2 included no explanations and no approval.
Treatment 3 incorporated explanations as well as approval.
Treatment 4 utilized explanations, but without the experimenter's approval.
treatment.

Modeling was incorporated into each

It was hypothesized that the four experimental

treatments would result in significantly different numbers
of subjective moral judgments.

To test this hypothesis,
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Table 3
Mean Number of Subjective Moral Judgments
Made by Objective and Subjective Subjects in Four
Experimental Treatments at Three Phases of the Experiment

Objective Subjects
Pretest Phase

Experimental Phase

Posttest Phase

LA:..

Mean

0.92

-5.20

3.33

4.80

l.80

1.14

4.00

Treatment 3

l.70

1.16

Treatment 4

1.10

0.99

Mean

-

S.D.

2.20

Treatment 2

Treatment 1

-

-S.D.

3.23

5.20

3.16

5.70

3.53

8.20

2.10

4.70

2.71

6.30

3.33

Mean

3.74

Subjective Subjects
Pretest Phase

Experimental Phase

Posttest Phase

-

-

S.D.

Mean

~

Mean

§..:Jh

1.17

5.80

2.35

-

6.50

3.06

Treatment 2

8.80

1.03

6.20

2.97

8.10

3.38

Treatment 3

8.10

0.99

5.80

3.16

5.30

3.46

Treatment 4

8.90

1.20

7.00

3.50

6.70

3.86

Mean
Treatment l

8.60

-
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simple analyses of variance were performed upon the data
for objective and subjective subjects from each phase of
the experiment.

These analyses are summarized in Table 4,

which shows that none of the treatments differed from one
another at any phase of the experiment for either group of
subjects.

The hypothesis was therefore rejected.

Although the four treatments were shown not to differ
from one another when compared separately, the data were
re-combined so that the effects of experimenter approval
or nonapproval could be demonstrated.

Treatments l and 3,

which included the experimenter's approval of the model's
responses, were compared with Treatments 2 and 4, which
did not include such approval.

The data were also ana-

lyzed for the effects of the model's explanations.

Thus

the treatments which incorporated explanations (Treatments
3 and 4) were compared with those which did not (Treatments land 2).

Table 5 summarizes the results of this

analysis for subjective subjects.

The only significant

variable in this analysis was Phases (1:13.02;

~=2.72;

£<.001) reflecting the fact that significantly different
numbers of subjective moral responses were given by subjective subjects in the three phases of the experiment.
This is illustrated in Figure 1.

No significance
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Table 4
Summary of Analyses of Variance of Subjective
Moral Judgments by Objective and Subjective Subjects
in Four Treatments at Each Phase of the Experiment

!*
Objective Subjects
Pretest Phase

1.85

N.S.

Experimental Phase

0.51

N.S.

Pos ttea t Phase

2.35

N.S.

Pretest Phase

l.04

N.S.

Experimental Phase

0.36

N.S.

Posttest Phase

1.13

N.S.

Subjective Subjects

*~

•

3,36

- 61 Table 5
Analysis of Variance of Subjective Moral Judgments
for Subjective Subjects

Source

-df

Total

119

Between Subjects

-

MS

-F

39

Approval/No Approval Treatments

l

26.14

2 .18

Explanation/No Explanation Treatments

l

4.04

0.34

Approval x Explanation

l

l.18

0.10

Error Between

36

12.00

Within Subjects

80

Phases of Experiment

2

65.10

Phases x Approval

2

3.13

0.63

Phases x Explanation

2

7.43

1.49

Phases x Approval x Explanation

2

0.21

0.04

72

s.oo

Error Within

****2. <.001

13.02****
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accompanied the variables of Approval or Explanations or
their interactions.

This suggests that, for subjective

subjects, the decreasing number of subjective judgments
over the three phases was not due to any particular influencing technique employed by the model and experimenter.

The subjective subjects produced fewer subjec-

tive responses when ex.posed to a model who responded in
an objective fashion, irrespective of the model's explanations or the experimenter's approval.
The results of a similar analysis for objective
subjects are presented in Table 6.

Again, Phases proved

to be a highly significant variable (!=44.71; .2!•2,72;
£<.OOl).

Also significant was the interaction between

the variables of Phases and Explanations (!•4.38; £!c2,72;

£<.025).

For the objective as well as the subjective

subjects, it made no difference whether the model's re•
sponses were approved by the experimenter.

But the in-

crease in the mean number of subjective responses over the
three phases of the experiment did depend upon whether the
model explained her responses.
To determine the nature of the interaction between
the Phases and Explanations variables, a further analysis
of the data from the objective subjects was made by means

- 63 Table 6
Analysis of Variance of Subjective Moral Judgments

for Objective Subjects

Source

S!

Total

119

Between Subjects

-

MS

-F

39

Approval/No Approval Treatments

1

18.41

1.54

Explanation/No Explanation Treatments

l

16.88

1.41

Approval x Explanation

1

4.39

0.37

36

11.97

Error Between
Within Subjects

80

Phases of Experiment

2

208.81

Phases x Approval

2

0.91

Phases x Explanation

2

20.47

Phases x Approval x Explanation

2

4.52

72

4.67

Error Within

**e. < .025
****e. < . 001

44. 71****
0.91

4.38**

0.97
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of

s

tests.

The No-Explanation treatments (Treatments l

and 2) were compared with the Explanation treatments
(Treatments 3 and 4) at each phase of the experiment.

The

comparisons are summarized in Table 7, which shows that
only in the posttest phase did the subjects in the Explanation and No-Explanation groups give significantly different
mean numbers of subjective responses.

Figure 3 illustrates

that in the posttest phase, objective subjects who had heard
the model's explanations gave 7.3 subjective responses,
whereas those to whom the model did not explain her answers
gave only 4.5 subjective responses in the posttest phase.
Results Pertaining S2., Sb!, Control Groues
The present investigation included two control groups.
The first group of 20 subjects was treated exactly like
the subjects who were exposed to the experimental treatments
except that no model was present during the experimental
phase.

Measures were obtained from these control subjects

at each of the three phases of the experiment.

Ten con-

trol subjects were objective on the pretest, ten were subjective.

Analyses of variance of the mean number of sub-

jective moral judgments produced by the objective and
subjective control subjects across the three phases of the
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Table 7
Comparisons of No-Explanation Treatments (Treatments 1 and 2)
with Explanation Treatments (Treatments 3 and 4) for Objective
Subjects at Each Phase of the Experiment

Pretest Phase

38

1.82

N.S.

Experimental Phase

38

0.60

N.S.

Posttest Phase

38

2.27

.05
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- 67 experiment were performed.

-

The values of F were nonsig-

nificant for objective control subjects (l • 0.51,

.2! •

2 ,18,

e.> .05)

jects (l • 0.60,

as well as for subjective control sub-

.2! • 2,18,

2>.0S), indicating that the

control subjects produced essentially the same number of
subjective responses at each phase.
The second control group was also made up of 20 subjects.

These children were randomly selected from the

classrooms which supplied the original 168 subjects for
the pretest phase of the experiment.

Their only contact

with the moral judtpnent stories was with the posttest,
administered at the same time as the 100 other subjects.
It was necessary to compare the moral judgments of
the posttest control subjects with the judgments made by
the original 168 subjects since they were all selected at
random from the same population.

The 80 experimental

subjects and the 20 subjects from the first control group,
on the other hand, were selected on the basis of their
scores on the pretest.

The mean number of subjective

moral judtpnents made by the 168 original subjects was
4.67.

The mean number of subjective moral judgments made

by the 20 postteat control subjects was 5.20.

These means

do not differ significantly (S•0.74; !!,!•186).

It can
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therefore be concluded that the interval of time from pretest to posttest did not alone contribute to any changes
in the moral judgments of the subjects.

Chapter IV
Discuesion
I!!!, Effectiveness

2.! Models !!! Influencing Children's

Moral Judgments
The first purpose of the present experiment was to
demonstrate the fact that children's moral judgments can
be influenced by exposing them to adult models who advocate opposite moral points of view.

This is a fact which

has been demonstrated in the past by Bandura and McDonald

(1963), Dworkin (1968), and Cowan et al. (1969).

The

present study gave further support to the findings of
Bandura and McDonald and Cowan et al. that children's
moral judgments can be influenced regardless of the moral
orientations with which they began the experiment.

That

is, objective children can be influenced to make subjective
moral judgments, and subjective children can be influenced
toward objectivity.
The fact that subjective children can be influenced
toward objectivity might seem to call into question
Piaget's cognitive development theory of the process by
which children come to make mature moral judgments.
Piaget theorized that the primary means by which children
abandon the objective and adopt the subjective point of
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- 70 view is through increased cooperation with and mutual
respect for peers (Piaget, 1965).

The implication is

strong in Piaget's theory that children will not reverse
themselves to adopt an objective viewpoint after they
have previously attained a subjective attitude.

Piaget

considers the progression from objectivity to subjectivity
to be in a natural direction, its speed determined primarily by the length of time it takes a child to become
relatively free from adult constraint.

Because adults

must impose a system of rules for living upon children
before they are capable of understanding the reasons behind the rules, adults fall into the habit of issuing
instructions without furnishing a rationale and children
unilaterally respect such rules without questioning why
they were given.

His theory further assumes that when a

child begins to interact with other children on a reciprocal basis, judgments about the good and right of action
begin

to

be made on the basis of the agent's intentions

rather than according to a set of arbitrary rules.

Piaget

has even suggested that the process of attaining the subjective moral viewpoint could be speeded by placing children in communal situations like nursery schools or kibbutzim at an earlier age than is now customary (Hall, 1970).

- 71 When children make moral judgments on a subjective basis,
according to Piaget, they ere no longer liable to the
objectivity which characterized their earlier judgments.
The present study, however, has demonstrated that objective moral judgments can be elicited from subjective
children who are exposed to an adult model who makes
judgments on an objective basis.
There are some possible explanations for this apparent
violation of Piaget's cognitive development theory of moral
judgment.

It has been argued by Turiel (1966), in dis•

cussing similar results reported by Bandura and McDonald
(1963), that only superficial verbal responses were affected by the training through model exposure and that the
underlying cognitive structures which are basic to Piaget's
theory were not really affected.

Turiel based his argument

primarily on the fact that the posttest in the Bandura and
McDonald study followed illll1l8diately after the experimental
training procedure.

Since that argument was proposed,

however, Cowan et al. (1969) and the present investigation
have shown relatively long-lasting effects of the modeling
procedure upon the moral judgments of subjective children.
Another explanation for the present findings may be
found in the argument by Cowan et al. that their results
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did not vitiate the Piagetian stage theory because the
experimental task itself was not an appropriate measure
of children's moral judpents.

They suggested that the

restrictions of their experimental procedure prevented
them from adequately testing Piaget's theory by incorporating his own clinical interview technique.

The present

investigation included an experimental procedure similar
to that used by Cowan et al.

Bandura (1969b) has pointed

out, however, that the interview technique employed by
Piaget actually included a form of symbolic modeling as a
means of testing the firmness with which a moral attitude
was held by a child.

For example, Piaget often suggested

to children he interviewed that other children would feel
differently about the story he told them, and asked how
they could justify their responses in light of that knowledge.

Such a technique constitutes symbolic modeling and

is thus somewhat comparable to the experimental procedure
in the Cowan et al. study and in the present investigation.
It would appear that a strict interpretation of
Piaget's cognitive development theory of moral judgment
does not apply to the results of the present study because
of the demonstration that subjective children can be
influenced by adult models to alter their moral judgments
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toward objectivity and that this modification persists
after a period of three weeks even though the model is no
longer present.

Bandura's social learning theory is a

good alternate explanation for the present demonstration
that children who were of a mature moral attitude could
be influenced by a model to make immature moral judgments.

Bandura 's theory holds that simply observing a model who
consistently advocates a particular point of view is often
sufficient to bring about a change in the observer's
attitude (Baldwin, 1967).
Inspection of Figure 2 suggests that objective subjects in the present study may have been influenced toward
subjectivity to a greater extent than subjective subjects
were influenced toward objectivity.

This observation can

be accounted for in Bandura's social learning theory by
noting the probability that children of a subjective moral
orientation have a different history of reinforcement than
children of an objective moral orientation.

In a recent

article Bandura (1969b) has suggested that an important
factor in a child's switch from an objective to a subjective moral orientation is the social reward he obtains from
his parents for doing so.

Bandura theorized that when

parents feel a child is capable of taking into account the
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intentions of someone who does something wrong, they begin
to reward the child whenever he does and the child thereby
learns a new mode of thinking.

Such children would have a

much different reinforcement history than children who
continued to make objective moral judgments and had seldom
or never been rewarded for making subjective judgments.
The objective and subjective subjects in the present study
may have had very different reinforcement histories, and
this may account for the result that objective subjects
were more influenced toward subjectivity than subjective
subjects were influenced toward objectivity.

If the sub-

jective subjects had a history of being rewarded for subjective moral judgments, that history would work against
their being influenced by a model who advocated the objective point of view.

The objective subjects, on the other

hand, may not have a history of strong reinforcement for
the objective viewpoint (since adults do judge acts in
terms of intentionality) and this may account in part for
the fact that they were more easily influenced by the
model.

!!!!, Effects

2!

Different Treat:lnents Upon Children's

Moral Judgments
The present study incorporated three influencing

- 75 techniques in four experimental treatments.

In all treat-

ments, an adult female model made moral judgments in a
manner contrary to that of the subject, as determined by
the pretest.

Experimenter approval and explanations by

the model were used in some of the treatments.
For objective subjects as well as subjective subjects,
comparisons of the four treatments used in the present
study revealed no differences among the treatments at any
phase of the experiment.

No one treatment influenced

children to alter their moral orientations more than any
other treatment.

Apparently all four treatments resulted

in a similar degree of change in the subjects' moral
judgments.

Thus the hypothesis that the treatments would

produce different amounts of change in the moral judgments
of the children was rejected.

Even when the effects of

the treatments were combined so that those treatments
which included the experimenter's approval of the model's
responses could be compared with those treatments which
did not, no differences were found at any phase of the
experiment.

This is consistent with the findings of

Bandura and McDonald (1963), who reported that approval
alone produced no changes in the subjects' responses.
Dworkin (1968) also found that approval by the experimenter

- 76 resulted in little change in his subjects' moral orientations.

It may be that children will alter their moral

judgments if they are rewarded for doing so, but approval
by

the experimenter is apparently not the sort of rein-

forcement which will bring about such a change.

More

tangible rewards or approval by an important adult such as
a teacher or parent might result in a significant change
in children's moral judgments.
Differences among the treatments were found when they
were compared on the basis of whether or not they included
explanations by the model.

When all four treatments were

compared individually with one another these differences
were obscured.

But for the objective subjects, the treat-

ments which included the model's explanations resulted in
a greater number of subjective moral judgments at the posttest phase of the experiment than those treatments which
did not include such explanations.

For subjective subjects,

however, there was no difference at any phase of the experiment between the treatments which included explanations
and the treatments which did not.
Children who were subjective at the beginning of the
experiment, then, were not swayed from that point of view
either by rewards or by logic.

This fits in with Piaget's

- 77 theory which holds that children who have attained a
mature, subjective, 1110ral point of view recognize the
logic of that view and will not be persuaded from it.
Taken as a whole, however, subjective children did significantly change their moral judgments as the experiment
progressed through its three phases.

This change was not

due to any single kind of treatment.

Nor was it due to

the fact that the experimenter sometimes approved the model 'a responses.
was not a factor.
exposed

to

Whether the model explained her responses
Apparently the simple fact of being

an adult model

who

made objective, or immature,

moral judgments was sufficient to bring about a significant
change toward objectivity in the moral judgments of subjective children.
The results reported for the subjective children were
probably due to what Bandura (l969a) bas referred to as
the response facilitation effect of observing a model.
That is, the general class of objective judgments was made
more likely to occur by presenting an adult model who made
such judgments.

In this case, no new learning took place,

since all children who reached a subjective moral point of
view are preswned to have already passed through the objective stage of moral reasoning.

The children learned
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that the experimental situation was an appropriate place
to make moral judgments of an in:mature nature.

Turiel

(1966) has argued that the essential cognitive structures
which facilitate mature, or subjective, moral judgments
are not really affected by the influencing techniques used
in the present experiment.

This contention has received

support from the demonstration that the model's explanations, which were directed at the subjects' logical
thinking, did not result in an increased number of objective judgments among subjective subjects.

Although the

subjective subjects were influenced by the model to make
objective judgments, her explanations for doing so were
not convincing.
Subjects who began the experiment with an objective
moral orientation also altered their responses to a significant degree as the experiment proceeded through its
three phases.

They began the experiment making almost

entirely objective moral judgments, but produced more and
more subjective
posttest phases.

jud~~ents

during the experimental and

As in the case of the subjective sub-

jects, it made no difference whether the model's responses
were approved by the experimenter.

The same amount of

change in the subjects' responses occurred regardless of
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the experimenter's approval or lack of it.
In contrast to the results obtained with the subjective subjects, however, the degree to which objective
children changed their responses toward subjectivity did
depend upon whether the model gave explanations for her
responses.

In the posttest phase of the experiment, ob-

jective children who bad beard the model explain her responses produced a significantly greater number of subjective responses than objective children who did not bear
such explanation.

For subjects who began the experiment

with a subjective moral orientation, however, it made no
difference whether the model explained her responses.
The simple modeling effect which was found

to

operate

in the case of the subjective subjecta was also present as
far as the objective subjects were concerned.

This can be

seen by the fact that objective children produced a greater
number of subjective responses in each succeeding phase of
the experiment, at all times irrespective of the experimenter's approval, and in the experimental phase irrespective of the model's explanations.

The children learned to

make a new kind of judgment simply by being exposed to a
model who did so.

But the modeling effect was not the

only significant variable which operated in the case of
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objective subjects.

The model's explanations resulted in

an even greater number of subjective responses in the
posttest phase of the experiment.
It is likely that the model's explanations presented
the objective children with information which allowed them
to

adopt the subjective point of view.

In this context it

is apparent that Piaget was correct in his observation
that by purely cognitive or rational means it is possible
to teach formerly objective children the concept of subjectivity but that it is not possible to reverse a child's
judgment from the objective to the subjective frame of
reference.

That is, logical explanations only work if

they are oriented toward increasingly mature judgments,
but not if they are aimed at influencing children to make
less mature moral judgments.
The modeling effect has been shown in the present ·
study to be a powerful one for altering the moral judgments
of both objective and subjective children.

This supports

Bandura's social learning theory of the means by which
children learn to make such judgments.

In addition,

Piaget's observation that the judgments of subjective
children cannot be influenced toward objectivity by the
use of logical persuasion was also confirmed.
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Ih!. §!.! g,! .£!l!. Subjects !!. ! Variable !!!. Children's
Moral Judgments
The results of the present experiment showed the sex
of the children did not influence their susceptibility to
the influence of a female model who advocated alternative
moral points of view.

Boys and girls proved to be equally

susceptible to the various treatments used in the present
study.
Implications £2.!. Influencing Children's Moral JudHtUents
Dworkin's conclusion that a training technique which
stresses the communication of cognitive information by a
model promotes effective and long lasting learning
(Dworkin, 1968, p. 89) has been supported by the results
of the present study.

This is true only in the case of

children who have not yet obtained the subjective

~iewpoint

in moral reasoning, however.
It is unlikely that in any real life setting an attempt would be made to influence subjective children to
respond in an objective fashion.

Such an attempt 'WOuld

be contrary to the direction of accepted socialization.
In order to test the implications of the cognitive development and social learning theories of moral development,
however, the present investigation did include an attempt
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to influence subjective children toward objectivity.

It

was felt that such an attempt did not pose any long-term
threat to the normal socialization of the children involved
because their exposure to the experimental manipulation
was very slight compared with the influences of parents,
teachers, and many peers toward subjectivity to which they
were exposed daily.

To insure that the effects of the

experiment did not continue beyond the posttest, all subjects were debriefed at the conclusion of the experiment.
While it is unlikely for subjective children to be
trained toward objectivity, the opposite approach of
training objective children toward subjectivity is a
common goal of the American socialization agencies of
home, school, and church.

The influencing technique in

the present investigation which incorporated the model's
explanations was similar to the "inductivett parental
disciplining procedure described by Hoffman and Saltztein
(1967}.

These investigators found that seventh grade

children

de~eloped

mature moral attitudes, as revealed in

Piaget-type moral judgment stories, most rapidly when
their parents employed the tactic of disciplining their
children inductively.

That is, these parents pointed out

to their children the negative or even painful consequences

- 83 of the children's misdeeds for the parents or for others.
Other disciplinary measures such as withdrawal of love,
physical punishment, or material deprivation did not
result in as rapid adoption of a subjective moral attitude.
In fact, the least effective method of instilling subjectivity in children was the use of physical punishment.

I!!!

Relationship Between Moral Judgment !.!!!! Moral Behavior
The present study has focused on children's moral

judgments.

It is not to be construed from the results that

moral behavior necessarily stems from subjectivity in moral
attitude.

Rather, mature moral attitude as defined by the

experimental task refers primarily to maturity in a form
of logical thinking.
Hartshorne and May (1928), Havighurst and Taba (1949),
Hoffman (1963), and many others have demonstrated that
children who

e~e

able to make mature moral descisions are

nonetheless susceptible to temptation or can react more
out of passion than logical thinking.

Apparently the

judgment of external, fairly abstract situations is quite
different from reacting personally in a similar situation.
The results of the present study have shown that
models can be used to influence children's moral judgments,
particularly if the modeling situation includes cognitive
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information in the form of the model's explanations for
her responses.

A

rele~ant

area for future research might

be the application of such influencing techniques to
actual behavior in moral situations.

Grinder (1962), for

example, has shown that observation of models can influence
a child's resistance to temptation.
technique~

to

The addition of other

a paradigm like his might suggest some

effective ways of training mature moral behavior.

Chapter V
Summary
Three influencing techniques were used to elicit
objective, or immature, moral judgments from children who
were shown to be subjective, or mature, on a pretest.
same techniques were used

to

The

elicit subjective moral judg-

ments from objective children.

The techniques were model-

ing, experimenter approval of the model's responses, and
explanations of her responses by the model.

The techniques

were incorporated into four treatments which included modeling alone, modeling plua approval, modeling plus explanations, and modeling plus approval plus explanations.
Ten moral judgment stories of the kind originated by
Piaget were read to 168 elementary school children to
determine their moral orientationa.

Each story described

a well intentioned or accidental act which resulted in a
great deal of material damage, contrasted with a selfishly
motivated act which resulted in very little damage.

One

hundred boys and girls, aged 6-4 to 10-2, were selected as
subjects.

Half the children were decidedly objective in

their responses to the pretest, and half were decidedly
subjective.

The subjects were randomly assigned to one of

the four treatment groups or to a control group.
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During the experimental phase of the study the experimenter read moral judgment stories alternately to an
adult female model and the individual subjects.

The model

responded in a fashion opposite that of the subject's
orientation as measured by the pretest.

In some cases her

responses were approved by the experimenter.

In some

cases she explained the rationale for her responses.

Sub-

jects in the control group beard the same stories but were
not exposed to a model, experimenter approval, or explanations of any sort.

Three weeks after the experimental

phase all subjects were asked to respond to another set of
moral judgment stories as a postteat.

Twenty additional

subjects who were selected at random from the original
population as an additional control group also responded
to the posttest.
The results showed that objective and subjective subjects were significantly influenced by modeling to adopt
the alternate moral viewpoint.

Objective children were

more influenced toward subjectivity than subjective children were influenced toward objectivity.

The most effec-

tive influencing technique was modeling alone.

At no time

did the experimenter's approval increase the degree to
which the subjects were influenced to change.

When the

- 87 model explained her responses, objective children adopted
the subjective orientation more readily than when she did
not.

For subjective children, however, the model's expla-

nations did not result in a greater number of objective
responses.

The sex of the subjects was found to be of no

consequence in terms of their susceptibility to the
influencing techniques.
The results were discussed in terms of their relevance to Bandura•s social learning theory and Piaget's
cognitive development theory.

The powerful modeling ef-

fect was interpreted as lending support to Bandura's interpretation of moral development.

Piaget's theory was

supported by the demonstration that the model's explanations were effective only in influencing children in the
direction of increasing subjectivity.

Further research

was suggested to clarify the relationship of moral judgment to moral behavior.
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APPENDIX A
Stories Used in the Pretest Phase
Story 1:
One day Jane took her mother•s scissors when her mother was
out.

She played with them for awhile on her bed.

But Jane

didn't know how to use the scissors very well and she cut a
little hole in the blanket.
Mary wanted to make her mother a nice surprise picture.
Mary was cutting a picture on her bed.

But Mary didn't

know how to use the scissors very well and she cut a big
hole in the blanket.
Story 2:
One day Oscar's father was pulling weeds from the flower
garden.

Oscar liked to help his father so Oscar asked if

he could pull some weeds too.
that Oscar wanted

to

His father was very happy

help him.

Oscar worked real hard.

But Oscar didn't know what the flower plants looked like
and he pulled out almost all of the flower plants as well
as the weeds.

Bill went over to his friend's house and asked him if he
could borrow his football for a little while.

His friend

said no, he didn't lend his football to anybody.
walked away.

So Bill

As Bill passed a flower that his friend was

growing in a flowerpot, Bill pulled a leaf off the flower.
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Story 3:
Denny and his friends had just eaten lunch.

They went for

a walk and passed by some apple trees that belonged to a
man that Denny didn't like.

Denny climbed over the fence

and took one apple.

Jimmy and his friends went on a hike one day.

Jimmy came

from a poor home and he did not have very much food for
breakfast that morning.
apple trees.

On the hike they passed by some

Jimmy climbed over the fence and picked ten

apples off a tree.

He

ate some and took some home for his

brothers and sisters.
Story 4:
Jane came in from playing outside.

She felt real tired so

her mother told her to take a rest.

Jane didn't know that

her mother left her bat on the sofa.

Jane walked over to

the sofa and plopped down.

When Jane laid down she

squashed her mother's hat all out of shape.
One day Doris' mother and father went visiting and Doris
was alone at home.

She wanted to see the things in the

top of her parents' closet.
not be home till auppertime.

Doris knew her parents would
So Doris climbed up on a

chair, but aa she was reaching for the thing• in the closet
the mother's hat box fell down and the hat got bent a
little bit.
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Story 5:
Chuck didn't care much for fingerpainting.

When the class

was fingerpainting one afternoon Chuck didn't do much

fingerpainting.

Chuck just played with the paint and

dribbled a little on his desk.
One day the teacher asked "Who would like to help clean up
the paints?"

Len said "I will, Mias Brown."

Len wanted

to help so much that he tried to carry six paint jars to
the sink.

But they slipped out of his handa and paint

spilled all over the floor.
Story 6:
Barbara decided that she would clean up her room and put
her toys away so that her mother would not have so much
work to do.

Barbara put her big doll in the toybox and

then she put the wooden blocks in too.

Barbara did not

think that the blocks would hurt the doll.

But when Bar-

bara put the blocks in the toybox they fell on the pretty
doll and broke it all to pieces.
Amy wanted to watch television but her mother said that
it was time to clean up and go to bed.

Amy didn't like

that because she could not watch her favorite program.
When her mother left the room Amy picked up a doll and
threw it on the floor.

When the doll hit the floor, one

of the doll's finger• broke off.
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Story 7:
Erma's sister was looking at pictures in a magazine.
wanted to look at the magazine too.

Erma

So Erma waited for a

while and then told her sister that she wanted it now.

Her

sister aaid that she wasn't finished looking at it yet.
Erma tried to take the magazine from her sister and as she
did one of the pages tore.
One day Hazel decided to make a pretty picture for her sister.

Hazel went to the living room and picked out a maga•

zine and cut out all the colored pictures.

Hazel did not

know that the magazine that she had cut to pieces was a
new magaaine that someone bad put on the pile of old magazines by mistake.

So Hazel's mommy and daddy bad no new

magazine to read all that week.
Story 8:
Gary and his friends were building a boat out of wood.
Gary cut the pieces of -wood and the other boys put the
pieces together.

They were just about finished building

when the other boys had to go home.

Gary said, "I'll

finish the boat so we can play with it when you come
back."

Gary was busy cutting the last piece but he didn't

know that the boat was under the board and be cut the boat
to pieces.

Once some boys were building an airplane on the school
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grounds.

They were almost finished putting the airplane

together when the schoolbell rang and they bad to go back
in the classroom.

Roger was the last boy to go back in.

As Roger ran past the airplane he noticed that no one was
watching so he decided

to

fly it.

Roger tossed it in the

air but when it landed the tip of the tail broke off.
Story 9:
One day when Peter's father had gone to work Peter thought
it would be fun to play with his father's fountain pen.
First Peter played with the pen and then he made a little
blot on the tablecloth.
One day when John's father was away Johnny noticed that
his father'• fountain pen was empty.

Johnny thought he

would help his father by filling the pen with ink so that
the pen would be ready when his father needed it.

But

while Johnny was opening the ink bottle, he made a big
blot on the tablecloth.
Story 10:
One afternoon Jill decided to take a walk to the playground.

Her mother thought that it might rain and she

called after Jill to take her raincoat.
hear her mother.

But Jill didn't

It did rain and Jill's new dress got

so wet that it shrank and she couldn't wear it any more.
One day Alice was going out to play.

Her mother told her
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to take an umbrella because it might start to rain.

But

Alice didn't want to carry the umbrella so she left it at
home.

It did rain and Alice's dress got a little wet and

had to be cleaned.

APPENDIX B
Stories Used For The Children
In the Experimental Phase
Story 1:
One day Floyd's father was painting the fence.
h~

father if he could help.

His father said sure.

Floyd got a brush and started painting.
ed for a while be stepped back

Floyd asked

to

So

After Floyd paint-

see bow it looked.

But

Floyd forgot that the paint can was right behind him.

His

foot knocked over the paint can and all the paint spilled
on the ground.
Paul came out to watch his father paint the barbecue table.
His father told Paul not to bother him.
that.

Paul didn't like

So when bis father went to the garage to get the

brushes. Paul took the paint stick and dribbled a little
paint on the ground.
Story 2:
Joyce was playing with her younger sister one day.

Soon

Joyce got tired of playing but her younger sister wanted
to keep on playing.

So Joyce hid her little sister's

doll so that they'd have to stop playing.
Sally was trying to teach her little brother a game.
were having lots of fun throwing a ball around.

But once

Sally threw the ball too far and a car ran over it and
smashed the ball to pieces.
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They
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Mark was hurrying to get to school one day so he wouldn't
be late.

Mark ran so fast that he dropped his schoolbooks

in a mudpuddle and they got full of .nud.
Jimmy's mother just finished reading him a story and then
it was tuae to go to bed.

Jimmy didn't want to go to bed

so he spilled milk on one of the pages of the book.
Story 4:
Kate was getting tired of waiting while her mother was
shopping.

So Kate ran up and down the aisles in the gro-

cery store.
careful.

The clerk told Kate to slow down and be more

But Kate was having a good time and she didn't

pay any attention.
looking.

She started to run again when he wasn't

As Kate turned the corner her hand hit a box of

kleenex and it fell on the floor.
Pam went grocery shopping with her mother one day.

They

were almost finished shopping when her mother remembered
that she needed a bottle of ketchup which was at the back
of the store.

Pam said• "I' 11 get it for you, mother."

As Pam was taking the bottle off the shelf, she didn't

lift the bottle high enough.

Three bottles fell off the

shelf and broke and the ketchup spilled all over the floor.
Story 5:
Fred was playing football one day.

His team was losing

- 102 the game.
game.

If Fred could score then his team would win the

Fred tried real hard to score, and he was running

real fast.

But he bumped into Tommy, a player on the other

team, and he broke Tommy's nose.
Jimmy wanted to play football with some of the bigger boys
but they said he was too si:nall and he might get hurt.
Jimmy didn't like that, so he stuck his foot out and one
of the boys who was running with the ball fell over Jimmy's
foot, and got a tiny scratch.
Story 6:

Hazel's older sister was putting a puzzle together, and
Hazel wanted to work on it too.

But her older sister

wouldn't let her and said to Hazel, "No, it's my puzzle,
not yours."

So Hazel watched her sister for a while.

When

her sister bent down to pick up a piece that fell on the
floor, Hazel took one piece from the puzzle and hid it in
her pocket.
Barbara was cleaning up her sister's room.

Her sister had

finished part of a puzzle and had put the rest of the
pieces in an old paper bag on the floor.

Barbara thought

that the bag was empty so she picked it up and threw it in
the garbage.

When Barbara's sister came to finish the puz-

zle she couldn't do it because most of the pieces were gone.
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David's mother said that he was old enough to pour his own
milk at the dinner table.

One day at dinner David was

pouring himself s glass of milk.

But the milkbottle slip-

ped from his hands and there was milk and broken glass all
over the table.
One day at breakfast Billy finished drinking his orange
juice before his brother.

Billy decided to take a drink

of his brother's glass when his brother wasn't looking.
But when he did a little orange juice spilled on the table.
Story 8:
Sharon's mother was making dinner one day.

While her

mother was getting the meat ready for the oven, Sharon

decided to turn the dial on the oven lower than it was
supposed to be.

So the family had to wait an extra half

hour for dinner that night.
One day Margaret was helping her mother make dinner.

Her

mother asked Margaret to turn the oven dial to 300 degrees.
But Margeret turned it to 400 degrees by mistake.

When it

was time to be done the whole dinner was ruined.
Story 9:

Joe and his father went
car.

to

the shopping center in theil.

As they were getting out of the car, his father

asked Joe to lock the car door.

But Joe didn't hear his

- 104 father , and so he just closed the door without locking
it.

While they were in the store, somebody took a very

expensive camera out of the car.
Bill was playing on the front lawn.

His father called

Bill for supper, and told Bill to bring his baseball in
with him.

But Bill wanted to play with his ball after

supper, and so he just left the ball on the front lawn.
While Bill was eating supper, somebody came along and took
the ball.
Story 10:
Norma was looking at the pictures that the family took
while they were on their vacation.

While Norma was looking

at the pictures she noticed that her brother was in moat of
the pictures.

So when Norma came to another picture with

her brother in it, she got a crayon and made a little mark
on the picture.
Alice and her siater were looking at the pictures of the
family.

They were laughing at some of the pictures taken

of them when they were little.

As Alice started to point

to one of these pictures, her hand bumped into a glass of
milk.

The milk spilled on the album and ruined about 20

pictures.

APPENDIX C
Stories and Answers Used For the Model
In the Experimental Phase
Story l:
Tony's friend was building a tower with blocks.

Tony

liked to help, and so when he saw his friend building the
tower, Tony helped his friend by bringing the blocks to
him.

But as Tony got up, he tripped and fell against the

tower, and the whole tower crashed down.
Harry asked one of the boys to play store with him.

But

the boy said, ''No, I'm going to build a tower out of
blocks." When the boy wasn't looking, Harry walked over
and knocked one block off the tower.
Subjective Response:

''Well, Tony was trying to help his

friend and he didn't mean to knock the tower down -- it
was just an accident.

But Harry knocked the block off on

purpose -- he really meant to do it."
Objective Response:

''Harry only knocked one little block

off a whole tower, but Tony knocked the whole tower down.
So I think Tony is naughtier because he knocked all the
blocks down and Harry only knocked one down."
Story 2:
Mabel was helping her mother vacuum the playroom.

As

Mabel was pushing the vacuum back and forth, the vacuum
bumped against the leg of a table.
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A bunch of records

- 106 fell off the table and 10 of them broke.
Rose's older sister played her record player a lot.

One

day Rose's sister kept playing the same record over and
over again.

Rose got tired of hearing this record.

So

Rose took the record and hid it for a couple of days so
her sister couldn't play the record.
Subjective Response:

''Mabel didn't really mean to break

the records -- it was just an accident.

But Rose hid the

record on purpose, so I think she was the naughtier one."
Objective Response:
only hid one.

"Kabel broke 10 records, but Rose

So Mabel was naughtier, because she broke

records and Rose didn't break any ...
Story 3:
One day Sam's friend threw a bag of water at him.

That

afternoon Sam saw his friend coming home from school.

Sam

hid behind a fence and as the boy passed by, Sam squirted
him in the leg with a water pistol.
One afternoon Jack was watering the lawn for his father.
One of his friends was passing by on the street and called
out to Jack.

While Jack was looking at his friend, the

hose squirted water all over the seats of a neighbor's car.
Subjective Response:

''Well, Jack was helping his father

water the lawn and he didn't mean to squirt water on the
neighbor's car.

But Sam squirted the boy on purpose -- he

- 107 -

really meant to do it."
Objective Response:

ttsam

just got his friend

a

little bit

w-et, but Jack got water all over the seats of somebody's
else's car.

Jack did more damage, so he was naughtier."
Story 4:

One morning Alice came in from the yard and found that her
mother was not back from the store yet.
would get some ice cream for herself.
cup from the cupboard.

Alice thought she
So she got a little

As Alice was going to the refrig-

ere tor, the cup dropped and broke.
Kathie's mother was late coming home from shopping.

Kathie

thought she would like to help her mother so she began to
set the table for supper.
dishes

to

As Kathie was carrying the

the table, three large dishes slipped out of her

hands and broke.
Subjective Response:
the ice cream.
her mother.

"Alice didn't have permission to get

Kathie was trying to do something nice for

She didn't mean to break the dishes ·- it was

just an accident."
Objective Response: "Alice only broke one cup, but Kathie
broke three big dishes.

Kathie broke more than Alice did,

and that's a naughtier thing."
Story 5:
Two first grade classes were playing a game to see which

- 108 class could kick the ball the farthest.
had had a turn except for Ross.
losing.

All the children

So far his class waa

But if Rose could kick the ball real far then his

class would win.

Ross took careful aim and kicked the

ball with all hie might.

The ball went sailing across the

playground and smacked into a window and smashed it to
pieces.
Harvey and his class were playing kickball when the schoolbell rang.

The teacher said, "Recess is over, let's go

back to the classroom."
kicking the ball.

Harvey didn't have a turn at

So when the teacher was lining up the

children, Harvey kicked the ball to the other corner of
the playground and someone else had to go and get it.
Subjective Response:

"Ross was just trying to win the

game, he didn't mean to break the window -- it was just
an accident.

But Harvey kicked the ball on purpose just

because he didn't have a turn."
Objective Response:

"Ross broke a window, and Harvey

didn't break anything.

Harvey just kicked the ball a

little ways, but Ross broke a window."
Story 6:
Lynn asked her teacher if she could take three reading

books home.

The teacher said yes she could.

That day it

was raining so Lynn's mother drove her home from school.

- 109 As Lynn was getting out of the car, the three reading
books fell out of her bands and dropped in a mudpuddle
and got all full of mud.
Diana and her older sister were watching T.V.

But the

older sister wanted

The older

to

watch another program.

sister just turned the T.V. to a different station.
said, "O.K. I'm not going to watch T .v. with you."

Diana
So

while her older sister was watching T. V. Diana went and
made a si.nall mark with a crayon in her sister's old
coloring book.
Subjective Response:

"Lynn didn't mean to get her book

full of mud -- it was just an accident.

But Diana went

and made a mark in her sister's old coloring book just
because her sister wanted to watch a different T.V. program.

She did that on purpose."

Objective Response:

''Diana just made one little mark,

and it was in an old book anyway.

But Lynn got mad all

over three books from the school, and that was a naughty
thing to do."
Story 7:

John was sitting at the supper table and be had eaten all
his food except for his potatoes.

John told his mother

that he did not want to eat his potatoes.

His mother said

that John ha<l to eat his potatoes or he would not get any

.. 110 dessert.

When his mother and father were busy talking and

not looking, John pushed his plate and it knocked over the
salt shaker and a little salt spilt on the table.
Peter and his parents were sitting down having supper.

The

mother needed some sugar which was next to Peter's plate.
Peter told his mother that he 'WOuld pass the sugar to her.
As Peter reached for the sugar bowl, his hand hit a bottle
of milk and the milk spilt all over the table.
Subjective Response:

"Well Peter was just trying to pass

his mother the sugar and he didn't mean
-- it was just an accident.

to

spill the milk

But John pushed his plate on

purpose just because he had to eat his potatoes."
Objective Response:

''Well John only spilled some salt,

and that can be cleaned up very easily.

But Peter spilled

milk all over the table and made a big mess.

He was

naughtier because he spilled more."
Story 8:
Leslie's mommy just finished baking a cake for dessert one
night.

But Leslie was very hungry and she didn't want to

wait until after dinner.

So when her mommy went into the

living room, Leslie licked a little frosting from the cake.
Joy asked if she could help her 010mmy with the baking one
day.

Her 010ther said that would be O.K.

mommy worked all day baking a cake.

So Joy and her

Joy was carrying the
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cake over to the table but she slipped on the floor.

The

cake fell to the floor and the family had no dessert that
night.
Subjective Response:

"Joy was helping her mommy and she

accidentally dropped the cake.

She didn't mean to do it.

But Leslie didn't ask if she could lick the frosting and
she did it on purpose."
Objective Response:

"Leslie only licked a little bit of

frosting off the cake, but Joy ruined the cake so nobody
could have any dessert.

Leslie didn't do very much, but

Joy dropped a whole cake, and that's naughtier."
Story 9:
One day when Fred came back from school he noticed that a
large board on the fence was loose.

He decided to hammer

the board back to the fence before his dog saw the hole.
So he got some nails but they were too big.

As Fred was

hammering in the nails they split the board to pieces.
The next day Fred's father had to buy a large board and
had to spend Saturday morning fixing the fence.
Irving and his friends found an old piece of lumber that
Irving's father had thrown away.
a small box with it.

Irving wanted to saw the pieces but

his friends didn't want him to.
he puabed the board.

So they decided to build

Irving didn't like that ao

It fell on the ground and a little
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piece broke off the end of the board.
Subjective Response:

"Fred was just trying to help and he

didn't mean to split the board -- it was just an accident.
But Irving pushed the board on purpose.
to do

He

really meant

that just 'cause the boys didn't want him to saw."

Objecti'l'e Response:

"Fred broke a board and his father

had to spend a whole Saturday morning fixing a new one.
But Irving just broke a small piece off the end of an old
board which had been thrown away.

So Fred did more

damage."
Story 10:
Mary thought it would be nice to clean her father's glasses
before he came home from work.

But while Mary was cleaning

them, they slipped from her hands and broke into a hundred
pieces.
Barbara wanted to play with her mommy's jewelry one day.
So she went into her mommy's bedroom and started to play.
But while Barbara was playing a small earring broke and her
mommy had to take it to the store to be fixed.
Subjective Response: ''Mary was trying to do something nice
for her father -- she accidentally dropped the glasses.
She didn't mean to break them.

But Barbara was playing

with her mommy's jewelry without permission."
Objectiv-e Response:

"Barbara just broke a small earring

- 113 that could be fixed.

But Mary broke her father's glasses,

and those can't be fixed.
glasses.

Her father had to get new

Mary was naughtier because she broke something

more important."

APPENDIX D

Stories Used in the Poattest Phase
Story 1:
John was in bis room when bis mother called him down to
dinner.
room.

John went down and opened the door to the dining
But behind the door was a chair and on the chair

was a tray with 15 cups on it.
cups were behind the door.

John did not know that the

John opened the door, the door

hit the tray, bang went the 15 cups, and they all got
broken.
One day when Henry's mother was out Henry tried to get
some cookies out of the cupboard.

Henry climbed up on a

chair but the cookie jar was still too high, and be
couldn't reach it.

While Henry was trying to reach the

cookie jar, be knocked over a cup and it fell and broke.
Story 2:
The teacher told the children to work at their desks while
she went to the principal'• office.

While the teacher was

out Jenny got up and went to the board.

While Jenny was

writing on the board she broke a piece of chalk.
Susie had finished her work in class one day.

The teacher

bad asked the children to take care of the flowers.

Susie

noticed that no one took care of the flowers that day.
She went to the sink and got a pitcher of water.

As Susie

was pouring the water into the flower vase the water poured
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It fell to the

floor and smashed to pieces.
Story 3:
Ned and his friends were building a treehouse.

The boys

were passing the boards to Ned who was up in the treehouse.
Ned bad helped a lot and they were almost finished.
handed Ned a big board for the roof.

A boy

But when Ned was

lifting the board it dropped out of his hand and fell
against the side of the treehouse, and the whole treehouse
crashed to the ground.
Once some boys were building a treehouse but they wouldn't
let Jim help.

They were planning to finish it after lunch.

Jim walked by the treehouse wben the boys were away to
lunch.

Jim climbed up in the treehouse and looked around.

He noticed that no one was there so he knocked off a small
board from the side of the treehouae.
Story 4:
Barbara wanted to buy some candy but she didn't have any
money.
and went

So Barbara took a penny from the kitchen drawer
to

the store to buy herself a little piece of

candy.
Kathie's mother asked her to go to the store and get some
groceries.

She gave Ka tbie a whole dollar to get the

groceries with.

But on the way to the store the dollar

- 116 fell through a hole in Kathie's pocket and got lost.
Story 5:
Randy went to the school library to get a book for his
teacher.

When Randy opened the door to the library a girl

was passing by with jars of fingerpaint.

Randy did not

know that the girl was behind the door.

The door hit her

arm, the jars fell out of her hands, and the fingerpaint
spilled all over the floor.
Clark was tickling one of the boys during their reading
lesson.
back.

The boy turned around and Clark jerked his hand
Clark's elbow hit a small jar of water.

It tipped

over and a little water spilled on the desk.
Story 6:
Margaret came home from school one day and saw her little
sister eating a cookie.
a bite.

Margaret asked if she could have

But her little sister said no.

So Margaret went

into her little sister's room and took a piece of candy
from her drawer.
Susie came home from school one day and found that her
little sister had spilled cookie crumbs all
room floor.
cleaner.

o~er

the living

Susie decided to clean them up with a vacuum

But while Susie was cleaning up, the vacuum

cleaner bumped into a lamp.
and smashed to pieces.

The lamp fell to the floor

- 117 Story 7:

Ed didn't know the names of the streets very well, and he
was not sure where Main Street was.

One day a man came up

to Ed and asked him where Main Street was.

think it's that way."

So Ed said, "I

But it was not that way.

The man

really got lost and could not find the place he was looking
for.

Joe knew the names of the streets very well.

One day a man

came up to Joe and asked him where Main Street was.

But

Joe wanted to play a little trick on the man and he said,
"It's that way," and he pointed the wrong way.

But the man

didn't really get lost because he found his way again.

Story 8:
Mary's mommy had just finished baking some cookies for

dessert one night.

But Mary was very hungry and she didn't

want to wait until after dinner.

So when her mommy went

into the living room Mary ate one cookie.
Alice and her parents went to the circus one day.

Alice

asked her mommy if she could get some chocolate candy.
mother said O.K.

Her

Alice was having such a good time watch-

ing the circus that she forgot she was holding the candy.
It melted on her new party dress and made a big stain.
Story 9:

One day Billy asked his friend if he could borrow his

- 118 bicycle for a little while.
O.K.

His friend said that would be

But while Billy was riding his friend's bike, he hit

a bump in the road and the front wheel of the bike got all
smashed and bent.
Jimmy was watching some boys play ball one day.
asked if he could play too but the boys said no.
next time the ball came close

to

Jimmy
So the

him, Jimmy picked it up

and threw it to the other side of the playground and one
of the boys had to go and get it.
Story 10:
Martha was playing • game of hopscotch with her friend one
day.

Martha waa winning the game.

real good jump at the end and
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But her friend made a

Martha lost the game.

Martha didn't like that so she just stopped playing and
went home.
Jane was teaching her friends how to play a new game one
day.

They were having a lot of fun throwing her friend's

new ball around.

But once Jane threw the ball too far and

a car ran over it and smashed the ball to pieces and they
had to stop playing the game.
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